Recently, the U.S. Congress passed the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act of 2007, which reads that "lasting stability and security in Europe requires military, economic, and political integration of emerging democracies into existing European structures." It provides for support (including financial) to NATO's further expansion and assistance to Georgia, Ukraine, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia in joining the organization.
The move caused a negative reaction in the Russian parliament, which issued a special statement describing the Congress' action as interference in domestic affairs "when these countries' people have not decided on their position yet."
Of course, the opinion of the U.S. Congress is not binding for other NATO member states. The decision on admitting new members is made by consensus, and in theory the position of American legislators is no more or less important than that of Belgians or Luxembourgians. Of course, in reality it is different: the United States holds a leading position within NATO and other members cannot ignore this fact. All the more so as the bill presents a coordinated stand of Republicans and Democrats. This means that if in 2008 George W. Bush is succeeded by a Democrat president, this direction of the U.S. policy is likely to remain unchanged. Moreover, America may even intensify efforts toward NATO expansion.
Croatia's entry is almost agreed upon. Integration of Albania and Macedonia also seems a matter of time, but may take longer. The situation is more complicated with Georgia and Ukraine, whose potential accession to the alliance worries Russia, because they will be the first CIS countries to join NATO. Russia views the bloc of post-Soviet countries as the sphere of its geopolitical interests. Ukraine's entry will fully separate it from Russia, although the two countries have been bound together since 1654, when Ukraine asked to become part of Russia. After Georgia's integration, the United States may deploy its anti-missile defense on its territory, as it is planning to do in Poland and the Czech Republic.
Yet Russia's objections are not the main obstacle to NATO's further expansion eastward. After all, Moscow's opinion was not taken into account when admitting the Baltic countries in the alliance. More importantly, Georgia has not yet resolved its domestic problems (the central government does not control all of the country's territory), although support to plans of NATO integration is high there: according to Baltic Survey and the Gallup Institute, as many as 83% of Georgians endorse them.
The situation in Ukraine is the opposite: there are no territorial problems, but only 20% of the population, according to the Public Opinion Foundation, supports the accession. Moreover, if Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili is keen on joining NATO, Ukrainian Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych says that his country will not be ready for integration in the near term. The confrontation between the president and parliament that is unraveling in Ukraine now makes it even more difficult for the country to integrate in Europe.
Does this mean that the advance the U.S. legislators have offered Georgia and Ukraine is a symbolic one? This would be too hasty a conclusion. Frank Boland, head of the NATO Assessment Team, visited Georgia last February and praised its leadership for the progress achieved in the implementation of the Individual Partnership Action Plan with the alliance. He said that the prospects of integration would depend on the outcome of reforms (and, consequently, not on the settlement in Georgia's two breakaway republics, Abkhazia and South Ossetia).
The situation with Ukraine is more complicated, as the public opinion is an important argument against accession. But it is not a decisive one. NATO has already had experience of admitting countries whose population was skeptical about the prospect, such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. By the way, half of Ukrainians would like their country to join the European Union, according to Public Opinion. A large-scale campaign seeking to persuade the public that Ukraine will not be accepted in the EU without being a NATO member, may win more proponents of Atlantic integration.
If President Viktor Yushchenko gets the upper hand in the current political confrontation, the country's integration in the West may accelerate. If Yanukovych wins, the process will only slow down, with more curtseys toward Russia. To put it simply, Yushchenko is a sprinter in this race and Yanukovych is a marathon runner.
So the U.S. Act has proved that Georgia's and Ukraine's membership in NATO is no longer a hypothesis, but an issue of real politics. This will inevitably invoke a tough reaction from Russia, aggravating its already complicated relations with the West.
Alexei Makarkin is deputy director general with the Center for Political Technologies.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
