ESTONIA
The media continue to focus on gas-related issues in Russian-Ukrainian dealings. The press still considers Moscow's political ambitions to be the main driving force in the conflict. "It is not so much the price of gas as the fact that the Ukrainian president does not suit Moscow. As for the price, the Ukrainians themselves have acknowledged that $50 for 1,000 cubic meters is a ludicrous price and it needs changing. But this ridiculous rate was set in a treaty concluded in 2004, during the presidential election campaign, when Moscow was sure that its man - Viktor Yanukovich - would continue as Ukraine's leader.
"Demonstrating its overly friendly attitude, Moscow then concluded a 'very cheap' gas pact with Ukraine for a period of five years - until 2009. By that time Ukraine was supposed to have returned to Russia's embrace, following the example of Belarus. But when the carrot scenario conceived by Putin fell through, Russia had to resort to the stick" (Pohjarannik, January 11).
The Russian-Ukrainian gas pact has drawn skeptic comments from the press, which is pointing to its non-transparency and hinting at corruption practices indulged in by RosUkrEnergo intermediary company.
RosUkrEnergo buys expensive gas from Gazprom, its parent company, mixes it with low-cost gas from Turkmenistan and loses about $1 billion in reselling it to Ukraine. Where's the logic? But the point is there is no economic logic here ... A number of agreements have been violated, an intermediary firm with fantastic objectives has been set up, and everyone is happy... It is current Russian economic practice to have official damage equal the sums accumulating in the accounts of certain key figures. The most intelligent thing Ukraine could have done was to have nothing to do with such a crafty scheme" (Parnu Postimees, January 14).
The press is disappointed by the agreement in German and Russian leaders' views on the North-European gas pipeline. "In the gas dispute the two states have adopted a placatory tone. The treaty to lay a gas pipeline across the bottom of the Baltic Sea is in force, although Merkel has promised to heed the Baltic Sea countries." (Eesti Paevaleht, January 17).
LATVIA
One of the central topics of the week has been the political crisis in Ukraine, which the Latvian press claims has been fueled by the Russian authorities. "The actual cause should be sought in the Kremlin. Vladimir Litvin, speaker of the Supreme Rada, has played the principal role in bringing down the government ... Ukrainian analysts point out that only a few days ago Litvin was received in Moscow, where he met with President Putin. Consequently, the real reason is not gas, but the 'Moscow handshake.' " (Diena, January 12).
"Many describe the developments in Ukraine as 'Russia's revenge' for Kiev's pro-western policy. It is entirely plausible, therefore, that they were stage-managed in the Kremlin. It is hard to guess at the outcome ... But one thing is clear: Russia is trying to regain its weight in Ukraine." (Biznes&Baltia, January 12).
The media are calling attention to the fact that Russia's moves against Ukraine have become a sort of paradigm for a new energy policy in relation to other countries in Europe's post-Soviet space. "Having practiced the maneuver on Ukraine, the Kremlin has concluded that it is time to test its 'gas weapons' against Europe. 'The average price for the gas exported by Russia to the European countries will be brought up to $250 per 1,000 cubic meters,' Gazprom spokesman Kupriyanov said yesterday. Europe is shocked ... " (Telegraf, January 11).
In the opinion of the Latvian press, Angela Merkel will initiate a distancing from Russia and building up closer ties with the U.S. "The Russian-Ukrainian gas war has cooled Germany's attitude to Russia. Merkel, who grew up in the Communist portion of Germany divided in the Cold War, will focus on economic cooperation in relations with Putin, instead of developing a friendly approach" (Diena, January 16).
LITHUANIA
One of the main topics of the week was the 15th anniversary of the storming of the Vilnius TV tower (January 13), which expedited the separation of the Baltic republics from the U.S.S.R. "In 1991 ... there were hopes that Russia, too, would go the way of progress. It was pursuing real market reforms, but they failed to bring Russia either progress or prosperity. Privatization was carried out in such a way as not to benefit the state but to enrich corrupt officials and groups of new-style Russian businessmen appearing out of thin air. The Western credits, including loans from the International Monetary Fund, were mostly misappropriated" (Verslo Zinios, January 13).
It is reported that Lithuania's Seimas (parliament) has sent an appeal to the Russian authorities asking them to extradite to Lithuania those responsible for the storming and deaths of civilians. "Apart from several leaders of the Lithuanian Communist Party, none of the participants in the violence during the January events have been brought to justice. Most of the military, including from Lithuania's OMON special police force, have fled to Russia, Ukraine or Belarus, while the Russian authorities are demonstrably dragging their feet, in no way reacting to a list of 25 'state criminals' wanted by the Lithuanian authorities" (Litovskaya Narodnaya Gazeta, January 12).
The agreement resolving the Russian-Ukrainian gas dispute is gauged as a document beyond all logic, one likely to conceal a secret collusion. "Experts have estimated that the scheme announced by Russian and Ukrainian representatives - to mix Russian and Turkmen gas - would be losing RosUkrEnergo $2.7 billion annually. Aware that no businessman in his sound mind could accept that, the experts supposed that Russia and Ukraine had signed a kind of secret pact enabling them to compensate the intermediary for its losses" (Lietuvos Rytas, January 11).
UKRAINE
Many local publications express the view that the latest "gas" agreement amounts to the Kremlin's political "victory." "The confrontation has ended in favor of Russian authorities, which have scored additional victories at this stage." (Galitskiye Kontrakty, January 12).
"The agreement, which was signed in Moscow, has drastically changed specific principles of the Ukrainian gas market's operation. Ukraine has now lost all Central Asian gas, which is an alternative to Russian gas. From now on, Naftogaz Ukrainy will prove unable to dictate monopoly gas prices to our industrial purchasers. The company has lost a large part of its previous profits." (Obozrevatel, January 16).
The national mass media discusses the expected signing of an additional protocol to the Russian-Ukrainian gas contract and voices concern over the country's energy security. "Fixed prices will be charged on mixed Central Asian and Russian gas only from January to June. And what happens next? Optimistic reports that such prices are guaranteed for the next five years remind one of similar assurances that the price of $50 per every 1,000 cubic meters of gas from Gazprom will stay for several years. Moreover, the private company RosUkrEnergo will now mediate inter-state relations. But law-enforcement agencies are already showing interest in its activities." (Versii, January 14).
Some publications think that the latest contracts are just a "ceasefire" in the unfinished "gas war." Moscow's "price" dictate is merely one aspect of the Kremlin's ambitious "scenario" allegedly aiming to take over Ukrainian industrial assets and to establish control over the country's economy. First of all, this concerns export-oriented and budget forming sectors, in particular, the metallurgical and chemical industry. "This implies a geoeconomic, rather than geopolitical, game. Gazprom acts as a forward-based element, engaging in real-life clashes. Its emissaries may eventually start buying Ukrainian enterprises. It appears as though RosUkrEnergo will make additional payments out of its own assets. And it may eventually go bankrupt. Consequently, an agreement stipulating a price of $230 would enter into force." (Glavred, January 13).
MOLDOVA
In the run-up to signing a contract between Gazprom and Moldovagaz, the gas dispute remains a priority issue in the mass media. "Moldova has lost its trump card - the control of gas transit - back in 1996, when a decision was made to establish a joint venture with Gazprom holding 50% plus one share... Under the current terms, Gazprom can regulate the prices and raise them as much as it wants, enjoying a unilateral privilege... As a result money is squeezed out of one of the shareholders" (IA Novosti-moldova, January 11).
Pro-Romanian journalists call for rejoicing over Russia's gas price hike. They believe Moscow is giving Moldova a "gift" that will enable it to break free from Russian influence and step up the republic's integration into Europe. "The republic has paid dearly for the privilege of a low gas price. It had to pay with its own independence, consent to interference in its home affairs and cede some of its territories... To keep its image intact it should reject favors and pay a just and balanced price, neither low nor unreasonably high ... Regardless of the price Gazprom will end up charging, Moldova, like Ukraine and the entire Europe, does stand a chance of winning the dispute with Russia." (Flux, January 12).
ARMENIA
Experts are unanimous that Moscow's move to raise gas prices has debunked the myth that strategic partnership with Russia is significant to Armenia. "Russia has never been Armenia's strategic partner, and its relations with the Russian Federation have always been those of a vassal and a lord... What happened [an increase in gas tariffs] was inevitable. Russia has never considered Armenia its strategic partner, while the Armenian leadership from time to time reassured the country of partnership non-existent in reality." (ÀrmINFIÎ, January 14).
Some mass media view the construction of an Iran-Armenia gas pipeline as a sole alternative to Russia's energy dictate. However, the press gives another opinion to the effect that hopes for Iranian gas are groundless. "In the run-up to a rise in gas tariffs Armenia should hold consistent, careful and serious negotiations to prevent a price increase or to secure a minimal price rise... ... Should Armenia demand that Russia withdraw its military base from its territory - the country would definitely end up the loser then. Meanwhile, to hope for Iranian gas would be too naive. Now that Tehran's relations with the West have deteriorated, Iran will not sell its gas to Armenia, and the Iran-Armenia gas pipeline is not likely to be completed less than in a year" (ÀrmINFO, January 16).
GEORGIA
The fate of the main gas pipeline remains one of the most discussed topics. Gazprom's desire to acquire it has given rise to numerous speculations in the Georgian press about Russia's geopolitical ambitions. "Gazprom is trying to persuade the Georgian government and buy the pipeline crossing Georgia for $250 million. In exchange, it will sell us gas for $95 instead of $110, say sources close to the company. Russia needs the pipeline to sell Iranian gas to Europe. It seeks to connect Central Asia and Iran with its own gas network to create a huge Eurasian cartel that will supply all European gas. It will set monopolist prices and will be able to dictate policies in Central Asia, the CIS and Europe. Russia will become stronger both financially and in military terms, because it will invest its enormous revenues from this giant cartel in the military sphere and restore its influence in the world... all this is designed to make the European Union and the United States recognize Russia as a superpower." (Akhali Versiya, January 9-15).
Experts are inclined to believe that Georgia does not have a real influence on a peace settlement on its territory and, most probably, will have to accept the option coordinated by Russia and the U.S. The pipeline may be a stake in the settlement. "Remember the details of the New Year statement of the U.S. State Department: the White House considers it a priority for 2006 for Moscow and Tbilisi to resolve their conflict. This means that Tskhinvali's fate has either already been determined or will be decided soon between the Kremlin and the White House. In this context, the resumed talks on the pipeline are no coincidence. The important thing is that Tbilisi should use Washington's influence to find points of contact with Moscow. If the Kremlin sees that at least some of its interests are taken into account in the politics in the Caucasus, it will not stand in the way of improving the situation. The time when Russia needed the Caucasus war-torn and shaken has long gone. Today economic relations are more important." (Kviris Palitra, January 9-15).
AZERBAIJAN
The press links the increase of Russian gas prices directly to Russia's possible economic expansion to oil producing regions of the Caspian Sea. "It has been said countless times... that the gas war can have repercussions in the Caspian Sea: Moscow's attempt to press its closest neighbors for a price hike has made Europeans think of how easily Moscow turns hydrocarbon supplies into a political tool. Moreover, they have said openly that energy supplies from the Caspian region can become a welcome alternative to both Russian and Middle East oil; so it is only logical that Russia would move to establish control over the Caspian oil fields." (Ekho, January 14).
KAZAKHSTAN
The main event covered in mass media is the Kazakh President's inauguration. Russian President Vladimir Putin's attendance is considered a landmark and important not only for Kazakhstan, but also for Russia itself. " Putin's presence in the Ak Ordy inauguration hall was meant to emphasize how important it is for Russia to maintain close ally relations with Kazakhstan, something it cannot say of its contacts with other former Soviet republics." (Liter.kz, January 13).
The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine is seen as a radical turn in inter-state and economic relations between post-Soviet countries. Admitting that oil and gas cooperation with Russia was a priority for Kazakhstan, the press laments about Russia's monopolism and its attempts to encroach on Kazakhstan's interests. "Any investor coming to a promising Kazakh gas field immediately asks: how can it be shipped? Russia's monopolism in the sphere cools the enthusiasm of even the wealthiest investors accustomed to normal civilized competition." (Gazeta.kz, January 12).
