The CIS leaders staked on the administrative resource and media political technologies, which turned out to be the weak link at a time of crisis, he said. The authorities in Shevardnadze's Georgia, Kuchma's Ukraine and Akayev's Kyrgyzstan won formal polls, but failed when challenged by network technologies based on young people.
In 2007-2008, Russia will face a most difficult time of power succession, and involving youth structures for the same purposes as in other former Soviet republics seems obvious. The only difference between Russia and other CIS countries is Russia's size. Qualitatively, it is as lost as them, not having a clear strategy, national idea or social and political dynamism.
Russia's current youth organizations can be divided into three groups. The first are exact copies of the so-called Orange structures, like Ukraine's Pora, Georgia's Kmara and others, with a definite destructive program and include the youth divisions of Yabloko and SPS, Going Without Putin, Civil Defense and dozens of smaller organizations. The core of the Orange youth has very contradictory opposition views, but the majority is attracted only by the possibility of mass entertainment and street performances.
The second group comprises conservative youth movements, like Nashi (Ours). The authorities have a serious strategy of countering threats that similar regimes in the CIS failed to fend off and had to pay for dearly.
Finally, the third group is totally depoliticized young people who are gradually beginning to realize their importance. This suggests that very unusual proposals can be introduced to the market of network youth projects. The most successful ones will most probably be used by major political players in 2007 and 2008.
