President Putin: A Constant Choice Between Carrots and Sticks

Following Putin’s win in the presidential election, experts are debating the future of Russia’s political system and public life under a Putin presidency, and the possibility that the reforms he, in one way or another, promised to the Russian people will be implemented.

Anticipated reforms

Putin received 63.60% of votes in the March 4 election. However, experts believe that despite his landslide win, the government will have to do some serious maneuvering to build relations with society and the opposition.

Alexei Makarkin, first vice president of the Center for Political Technologies, predicts that the government will harden its policy in some areas and make concessions in others. “I don’t think the government will pursue a purely liberal or reactionary course,” Makarkin said. “Most likely it will respond on a case-by-case basis to specific challenges.”

He does not see many opportunities for a more radical and tougher course. “People who voted for Putin do not want him to take a hard line,” he said.

Experts expect Putin to embark on a number of important, albeit not very popular reforms.

Leonid Polyakov, head of the General Political Science Department at the Higher School of Economics, told RIA Novosti: “Judging by what Putin proposed to the nation in his articles, he understands the need for serious reforms.”

General Director of the Political Information Center Alexei Mukhin thinks that Putin will have no other choice but to carry out reforms.

“The reservoir of trust given to him by the Russian people is making him a hostage to the situation,” he believes, adding that reforms will be implemented not only in politics, but also in the economy and social sphere.

“A revolution will take place in Russia but this will be a revolution from above and it will concern government officials. In fact, it has already started,” the expert maintains. “This is reflected in the radical change of officials in the executive branch and the presidential office, as well as in the regions.”

Polyakov thinks that a new government will play a big role in implementing reforms. “Specific plans depend on trends in the world economy, which is highly unpredictable. It is hard to say how events will develop in Europe or to determine the price of oil and other raw materials on which the Russian economy depends,” he added.

The agony of choice

Yevgeny Minchenko, Director of IIPE, a think tank for international politics, said that to understand what reforms are possible, it is necessary to analyze the mandate Putin has received and where he gained the additional votes to win outright in the first round.

“These are votes that went from Zhirinovsky and Mironov. In other words, they came from those who support more generous social benefits, a tough international policy, and rectifying imbalances in the country’s policies in inter-ethnic relations,” Minchenko explains.

The problem is that recent developments call for a rather liberal economic policy and a restrained foreign policy.

“Putin will have to maneuver between the contradictions of his mandate and the objective problems facing the country,” Minchenko concludes.

Makarkin predicts that Putin will most likely be cautious about political reforms.

“On the one hand, the opposition will aggressively demand new reforms, for instance, of the election system,” he explains. “On the other, Putin will only agree to reforms if he simply doesn’t have another option.”

Experts believe that Putin will not be able to avoid unpopular reforms. But it will take him some time to prove their necessity to all segments of the population.

“Putin has already proved that he is good at political maneuvering. So, unpopular reforms will be preceded by detailed explanation of why they are needed,” Mukhin said.

Putin will have to reform the pension system and, probably, eventually raise the retirement age, as many economists insist. However, Minchenko believes Putin will offload this ungrateful task onto someone else.

“Mikhail Prokhorov may join the government team,” Minchenko believes. “In this case, it will be possible to say that many people voted for unpopular social measures and Prokhorov has the ability to carry them out. Actually, this is why the government wanted Prokhorov to get votes in the election.”

Mukhin believes that Putin will have to re-introduce the progressive income tax and the luxury tax. “He may do this out of populist considerations – after all, he has to toss a bone to his voters.”

The business community has its own expectations. “Entrepreneurs expect Putin to keep his promise on reducing taxes on the non-energy sector,” Mukhin said.

Carrot and stick for the opposition

Relations between the government and the opposition may follow several scenarios.

“The government may offer the opposition the carrot of direct participation in political and social reforms,” Mukhin said. “Those who go beyond the law will get the stick of being punished under the Criminal Code because attempting a coup is a criminal offense.”

Mukhin believes that, in the near future, the opposition will have to choose whether to cooperate with the government by taking part in the political reforms or fight the government by staging provocations in order to get news coverage.

Minchenko is expecting attempts “to marginalize the opposition and use them for implementing certain initiatives when need be.” This will be easy to do, he believes. “Fragmentation will be a key instrument of marginalization and it won’t be difficult to carry this out thanks to President Medvedev’s bill on registration of political parties,” Minchenko maintains.

However, Polyakov hopes that “the government will offer the opposition to switch to dialogue.” The opposition will have to change how it interacts with the authorities. It will have to go from protests to specific political actions and the formation of political parties that will represent the interests of concrete political groups. He thinks that the part of the opposition that will not form political parties will resort to radical methods.

The views expressed in this article are the authors’ and may not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.