MOSCOW, September 25 (RIA Novosti)
Iran stands to gain from U.S.-Russia quarrel / Venezuelan president to pay pre-election visit to Russia / Moscow must stop ignoring Kiev's anti-Russian policies / Russians see Abkhazia, South Ossetia as their territory / Chechen president's deadly foe killed in public view in Moscow / Russia to develop its own cell phone
Vremya Novostei
Iran stands to gain from U.S.-Russia quarrel
Russian-American disputes over Georgia have given Iran additional time to implement its nuclear program without fear of international sanctions.
Reacting to Washington's tough stance regarding Russia's policy in the Caucasus, Moscow has actually frozen its cooperation with the United States on the Iranian problem.
It refused to hold an emergency meeting of foreign ministers of Russia, the U.S., China, Britain, France and Germany proposed by Washington.
"The state of Iran's nuclear program does not now demand extraordinary measures," Sergei Lavrov told reporters during the UN General Assembly session, commenting on reports that a six-nation meeting on Iran has been canceled.
To date, the UN Security Council has approved three sets of relatively mild sanctions against Iran, in December 2006, March 2007 and March 2008. They limit the country's foreign financial and economic operation and prohibit Iranians responsible for the nuclear program from traveling abroad.
These sanctions have not forced Tehran to curtail its nuclear program, which the U.S. and Europe believe is aimed at creating nuclear weapons.
Nina Mamedova, section head at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Oriental Studies, said: "It is naive to expect that sanctions will force Iran to honor the requests of the international community. The U.S. will continue to demand tougher measures against Iran, although there are few effective instruments against it. The only truly effective measure could be sanctions against Iran's oil exports, but the other countries are unlikely to approve them."
The Bush administration seems to have reviewed its attitude to Iran because pressure appears to be useless, and also because Washington needs more energetic Russian assistance in Afghanistan.
If Pakistan, worried by U.S. attempts to carry out raids against the Taliban in its border regions, decides to curtail its cooperation with Washington, the White House will have to ask Russia for broader use of its infrastructure, primarily pipelines and rail lines.
Azhdar Kurtov, an analyst with Russia's Strategic Studies Institute, said: "The troops of the U.S. and its allies have not scored major results in the war against the Taliban. They announced their victory in late 2001, but the Taliban still continue to operate throughout Afghanistan and are even increasing their activity."
Given this situation, agreeing on a milder attitude to Iran in order to secure assistance in Afghanistan would be the lesser evil for the U.S.
Kommersant
Venezuelan president to pay pre-election visit to Russia
Today Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez will meet with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in Orenburg, in the Urals. He is expected to express support for Russia in its confrontation with Georgia and make anti-American statements.
Since Chavez already settled the bulk of his economic tasks during his visit to China, he can use the stopover in Russia for preparations for the upcoming presidential elections, which will not be easy for him.
China and Venezuela have agreed to set up an economic and social development fund, in which China will invest $4 billion and Venezuela $2 billion. Chavez has also promised to increase oil supplies to China to 500 barrels per day in 2009 and double deliveries in 2011.
Venezuelan state oil and gas company PDVSA and China's Sinopec have agreed to build three oil refineries in China and one in Venezuela. China will also build three large-capacity oil tankers.
Taken together, this will definitely overshadow any projects Russia can offer the Venezuelan president.
However, Venezuela is more interested in buying Russian arms. In the past few years, a score of Russian companies, including energy ones, have tried to start projects in Venezuela, but nearly all of them failed.
Vladimir Semago, former MP and vice president of the Russia-Venezuela Business Council, said: "Four or five large Russian projects have failed in Venezuela since 2002."
For example, state-controlled power plant builder Technopromexport and Energoprom, a major supplier of power cables and other related equipment, considered building power plants using fuel oil and coal in Venezuela, but these projects collapsed after the feasibility studies were ready.
Power Machines, Russia's leading heavy machinery manufacturer, and RusAl, the world's largest producer of aluminum and alumina, also failed to get a foothold in Venezuela.
Chavez will definitely discuss military technical cooperation in Russia, although Caracas has been buying less Russian-made military equipment than it promised.
At the talks with a Russian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin in Caracas last week, Venezuela said it wants 20 Tor-M1 and Tor-M2E medium-range air defense systems, aircraft, and three or four submarines.
"Venezuela will not buy Russian submarines sooner than in two years," said a source in Russia's defense sector.
Russia does not seem ready to give Chavez the $800 million loan he wants for the acquisition of weapons. "At any rate, there is no agreement regarding submarines," said a source in the Russian banking community.
Izvestia
Moscow must stop ignoring Kiev's anti-Russian policies
Vitaly Tretyakov, dean of Moscow State University's Higher School of Television, said the Ukrainian government could deal a provocative strike against Russia soon after the abortive anti-Russian military-political adventure of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.
He told the Izvestia daily that Viktor Yushchenko's policies during the conflict with Georgia and afterwards showed that any other scenario was short of a miracle, and that such policies matched the logic of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state and the logic of national policy-makers.
Tretyakov said a fundamental mistake made by the Ukrainian state's architects in 1991 would eventually spell disaster for their project, but it was now creating problems for others.
He said they had overlooked the specifics of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and tried to create a Ukrainian nation state despite the lack of objective pre-requisites.
Under President Yushchenko, the Ukrainian government began to implement foreign and domestic policies hostile to the Russian state and nation, Tretyakov told the paper.
He said Kiev itself had chosen this line because of Moscow's loyal behavior to the young Ukrainian state. In 1991, Russia recognized Ukraine's territorial integrity, signed a bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty in 1997 and continued this policy despite Kiev's ambiguous stand until August 2008.
However, the Kremlin can no longer ignore Kiev's virtually official anti-Russian line, Tretyakov said.
He said Ukraine's domestic and foreign policies were determined by the demands of foreign countries, rather than by the country's population or even politicians caring about its territorial integrity, ability to function and long-term survivability.
Tretyakov said the policy aims to damage Russian positions as much as possible in exchange for maximum benefits for the Ukrainian elite's nationalist segment, and that the country's sovereignty would come under U.S. and EU jurisdiction.
He said the gas-transit business had ensured the Ukrainian state's economic survivability until now, but that the Ukrainian elite had been living off its anti-Russian policy.
Moscow can opt for an ideologically neutral, pragmatic approach in the field of economic cooperation, but has to change its entire Ukrainian policy, Tretyakov said.
Vedomosti
Russians see Abkhazia, South Ossetia as their territory
Public opinion surveys suggest that many Russians already consider South Ossetia and Abkhazia to be part of their own territory.
According to a survey conducted by the VTsIOM national pollster on September 20 and 21, canvassing 1,600 people in 42 regions, 81% of respondents said they felt good about the deployment of Russian military bases in the two republics recognized by Russia a month ago, while 10% criticized the idea.
More than a half of respondents, 55%, said Russia should provide interim economic assistance to the two republics, while 24% were in favor of permanent financing. Only 14% said Russia should not finance Abkhazia and South Ossetia as they are not part of Russia.
VTsIOM director Vladimir Fedorov said most Russians believed military bases outside Russia would strengthen its foothold. On the other hand, most respondents still insisted that Russia's financial aid to the two republics should be only temporary, saying they should not be turned into "permanent recipients of Russian transfers" and we shouldn't provide for them infinitely.
Alexei Grazhdankin, deputy head of Levada Center, another pollster, said people's willingness to temporarily provide financial support for the two newly-independent republics was fuelled by rhetoric and the footage of destroyed Tskhinvali shown repeatedly on TV.
According to the Center's survey earlier this month, 20% supported immediate admission of the two regions to Russia, 26% said it should be done later, and around 25% said they did not know.
The Russian government has allocated 12.8 billion rubles for the restoration of South Ossetian infrastructure, to be disbursed in portions over several years.
Audit Chamber head Sergei Stepashin said on Wednesday that government bodies needed to be established in South Ossetia as soon as possible to rule out a possible misuse of funds. Otherwise, the money will go to the winds, he said.
Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev agreed, urging to take efforts to prevent embezzlement and misuse of the government funds allocated for the restoration of South Ossetia.
Russia will help us as long as we need help, because we are Russian citizens, South Ossetian parliamentary speaker Znaur Gassiyev said with conviction.
RBC Daily, Kommersant, Vedomosti
Chechen president's deadly foe killed in public view in Moscow
Ruslan Yamadayev, Hero of Russia, former member of Russia's State Duma and member of the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, was shot dead in his own car outside the government building in Moscow. The motives will have to be investigated.
Analysts had expected an attack on his brother, Sulim Yamadayev, former commander of the Vostok Battalion, who left the army after Vostok's successful operation in South Ossetia and began an open confrontation with Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.
The Yamadayev clan is believed to be the only "teip" in Chechnya which is not controlled by the local government. Political analysts blame the federal government for the Chechen inter-clan feud carried over to Moscow.
Wednesday's murder adds to the long list of important Chechen public figures killed in Moscow in similar circumstances. No investigation has yielded any result, and no "murder customer" has been punished.
Oleg Orlov, head of the Memorial Human Rights Center, said: "There are similarities with the killing of Movladi Baisarov, commander of the Gorets special task group."
The former security forces officer was shot in Moscow in November 2006 by policemen dispatched from Chechnya.
"He stopped taking Kadyrov's orders, then openly spoke out against him, also in the media. But sometimes, they try to compromise an official by killing his enemy. It cannot be ruled out that the motive behind Yamadayev's murder was to shatter Kadyrov's position. This could even become the key version in the investigation."
"Khalid [Ruslan Yamadayev's nickname in Chechnya] was the mastermind of the opposition to Kadyrov," said a close friend of the Yamadayev brothers.
"Sulim, too, is a force to be reckoned with, but he devotedly followed the advice of his elder brother. To annihilate Khalid meant to neutralize Sulim for some time; they might try to attack him as well later on."
Dmitry Oreshkin, head of the Mercator think tank, said another murder of a Chechen politician in Moscow was a sign of Russia adopting "the Caucasus lifestyle," which was only natural because the federal government clearly supported that model.
Oreshkin believes Moscow was wrong to have given the Chechen government the go-ahead they seem to have taken as permissiveness.
"If the Kremlin cannot pay him off with $1.5-2 billion annually, Kadyrov will take other action. He will confiscate oil wells and take over oil companies soon. Russia won't be able to cut him short because no federal military or security forces have been left in Chechnya. Even Vostok has been ousted, and the other companies are directly controlled by Kadyrov," he said.
Gazeta.ru
Russia to develop its own cell phone
The Ministry of Industry and Trade has promised that Russia will produce its first domestically made cell phone in eighteen months. However, the outlook seems doubtful: Russian manufacturers are years behind, and are unlikely to challenge global brands.
Vladimir Minayev, director of the Ministry's radio electronic industry department, said production of cell phones will be "an extra option" for the operator of the Glonass space navigation system, initially established to cater to military needs.
The phones will be made at an operation owned by AFK Sistema, leading Russian telecoms and services holding, which through its subsidiary Sitronix owns 50% of the Glonass operator (the other half belongs to the Russian Space Agency, or Roscosmos).
True, neither Sistema nor Sitronix is yet aware of government plans. Their press services said only Glonass devices were under consideration. "Whether or not they will include mobiles is too soon to tell," Sistema said.
Sergei Fillipov, the head Sitronix spokesman, said his company does not plan to produce cell telephones.
Sitronix produced and sold cell phones in 2004 under the MTS brand, and later, in 2006, under its own name. To save costs, handsets were assembled on Taiwan, but had poor sales.
According to Eldar Murtazin, of Mobile Research Group, as many as 30,000 units were sold. In the upshot, Sitronix decided against entering the cell phone market and focused on other businesses.
Experts say it is impossible to organize the production of cell phones in Russia.
Maxim Savvatin, a leading analyst with iKS Consulting, believes the best time to do so was 10 years ago when the Russian market was not yet shared between world producers.
Additionally, Russia has no components production. "In China or Taiwan, phone assembly is cheaper, because they have supply outlets, and the labor is low-cost," Savvatin said.
In Murtazin's view, Russia has neither production capacity nor personnel capable of such a task. "Developing a Russian-made cell phone is like giving prehistoric man an axe and making him build a rocket," Murtazin said.
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