There are some surprises, for instance, the preservation of some ministries intact, like the Ministry of Health and Social Development, and the Ministry of Regional Development. The division of others was expected, for example the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is no longer in charge of trade. Trade is now the responsibility of the former Ministry of Energy and Industry, but having received "trade," it lost "energy."
Igor Shchegolev, who formerly headed the presidential protocol service, will now be responsible for the bigger Ministry of Tele- and Mass Communications, which will now include the media. Nikolai Patrushev's replacement as the FSB head was expected.
Other structural changes and appointments are not so dramatic, but very logical. They correspond to the new government's key tasks, which Vladimir Putin voiced on May 8.
Industry has been combined with trade, and will be run by seasoned official Viktor Khristenko. When divided, they did not help Russia function at a comfortable place to live.
Now a new ministry will supervise energy industry, with a nuclear expert in charge. This is understandable - fuel and energy is the backbone of Russia's economy, and nuclear power has an evident chance for breaking through in the global market to make the country far more competitive.
A special ministry will supervise sports. This is also logical, considering the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, a national project far more ambitious than all others, whether implemented or blueprinted.
Mass communications are shifting from the Culture Ministry to the Communications Ministry in another justified step - web and cellular technologies make mass communications more of a high tech than cultural phenomenon.
Federal agencies will survive, with a few exceptions. This is also reasonable - Russia does not need administrative revolutions. Now, the government has a three-tier structure, with deputy prime ministers for supervision, ministries for ideology and agencies for implementing ideas. If the new prime minister had given up this arrangement, executive mismanagement would have been even worse than in the early 1990s.
There is no end to the details concerning the new appointments. They plus the structural changes give ample room for predicting the road that the new Cabinet will embark on. I don't think, however, that the best political experts in Russia and other countries will concentrate on these particulars within the months to come. There is a much more trying question: will the "vertical power structure" made in the eight years of Vladimir Putin's presidency shift to the Cabinet under Prime Minister Putin? And who are Putin and Medvedev's men among the Kremlin and Cabinet's new blood? These are the relevant questions to ask with some officials moving from the Kremlin to the Government.
There are two options - a strong president or a strong prime minister. Current developments offer ample proof of either concept. A third version only seldom appears in the lobby - two parallel decision-making centers of comparable influence. They are not opposed to each other, but mutually complementary. This appears the most likely turn the events will take.
The goals publicly posed by the new president and prime minister within the past months and days are not the main focus of this process. Emotions put aside, both Russian rulers are demonstrating their determination to get bureaucracy really working, and make it give up selfish interests for its main job - to give Russia a good education system, health services and decent pensions, make industry and labor efficient, provide a sufficient workforce, and cut draconian taxes.
These goals appear unattainable only at first glance, so there is no reason to expect a fatal tug-of-war. Let's hope Putin and Medvedev's determination to invigorate and call the millions of Russian bureaucrats to order will not be buried by their sulky and silent resistance.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
