Interview with Nikolai Zlobin, director of the Russia and Eurasia Project at the World Security Institute (U.S.) Part II
In your opinion, neither the United States, nor Russia has a clear-cut policy in the entire South Caucasian region. They both tend to improvise. Is it a destabilizing factor?
I think that the South Caucasus has suffered from deteriorated Russian-U.S. relations. If they were strategic allies, as they planned to be just some time ago, it would be much easier to resolve many post-Soviet problems. But today the situation is directly opposite - the United States and Russia are aggressive towards each other in Eurasia; they are trying to oust each other from the region, and draw the local elites into their political squabbles. Settlement of any conflict is judged by one and the same yardstick - whose positions (Russian or American) will it enhance. In effect, a mild version of the Cold War is taking place on post-Soviet territory. It differs from the traditional Cold War not only in geographic dimensions but also in its exclusively tactical character, lack of strategy, and vague interests and spheres of influence. Moscow and Washington are improvising - they are reacting to events and taking single steps. This is considerably compromising regional stability, formation of competent national elites and elaboration of independent national strategies.
I believe that in the next few years Russian-U.S. relations will continue worsening, which is bound to affect the situation in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the election campaigns that are being launched in both countries may involve the region in the domestic political struggle both in Russia and the United States; different political forces may be tempted to use the region for their ends. This may further rock the situation in the South Caucasus and encourage some of its forces to use the unpredictable election situation in major countries.
Are you saying that Russia is not likely to pursue a predictable policy?
Unfortunately, I am. There is a whole number of reasons for this. Russia has not determined its foreign policy strategy and has largely replaced it with tactical goals and plans. In many respects, its foreign policy is monopolized by narrow groups that are exploiting it in their interests. Many of its important aspects remain frozen, for instance, its line on the U.S. Currently, Russia does not have an influential or even a numerically strong political or economic group that would be interested in upgrading these relations. As a result, they are not given proper attention.
Russia's policy towards former Soviet countries is largely determined by competition on the domestic market, attempts by big business to get access to new markets or keep their monopoly, as well as by the quality of Moscow's relations with the local governments. All these factors are temporary.
Is it possible that the United States or Russia may toughen their attitude to one of the parties in the Karabakh conflict under certain circumstances?
If any party tries to resolve this conflict militarily, Russia and the United States will strongly toughen their position on it. But with time such measures may lead to the adamant refusal to consider the refugee problem and restore justice in regard of innocent victims; both sides may be feigning their desire to resolve the problem.
The question of the Kosovo precedent has already become trite through frequent repetition. But still, could Kosovo become a model for settling post-Soviet conflicts?
Kosovo cannot be a model here. It will become a history lesson, a new experience but not a model. Moreover, I'm convinced that there will never be a common pattern for settling post-Soviet conflicts. Their character is different and they are all unique in some ways. They require different levels of involvement of outside players and international agencies. The more these conflicts exist in their current state, the more sophisticated and flexible the methods of their settlement should be. I think we will have to work out a fundamentally new legal, economic and political approach to the very idea of settlement -- much more intricate than in the case of Kosovo.
Some politicians claim that the right of the Karabakh people to self-determination does not run counter to Azerbaijan's right to territorial integrity. Do you accept Karabakh's right to self-determination?
Here we have come to the old dilemma in international law and world politics - between the right of nations to self-determination and the right of a state to territorial integrity. I'm convinced that the right to self-determination certainly overrides the right of a state to territorial integrity. After all, any state is simply a formalized instrument of implementing the rights and interests of its people. There is no doubt that their interests are above those of the state - unless the latter is simply a dictatorship that is suppressing these rights and interests. I believe that the priority of the right of nations to self-determination is universal and unconditional, and stems from world history, which boils down to the development of nations. As for states, their forms, borders, sizes or socio-political, economic and geographic characteristics have always been and will be transient.
Parliamentary elections in Armenia are just starting the big election marathon. The presidential race is ahead; it will be followed by the elections in Azerbaijan. Russia and the United States will also hold elections. What are the chances for Karabakh settlement in the near future?
If we talk about this period, I think there are none. Moreover, before elections serious politicians tend to avoid sudden steps, particularly in foreign policy, because they may destabilize the situation at home and have many unpredictable consequences.
The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
