Will political opposition bring change to Central Asia?

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(Sanobar Shermatova, a member of the RIA Novosti Expert Council) A number of opposition organizations in Central Asia have expressed themselves in favor of a change of government in their republics.

The recently-formed United Front demanded early presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan. In Moscow, the leaders of the Tajik Vatandor (patriot) movement promised to lead thousands of their supporters into the streets if President Emomali Rakhmonov does not step down. Uzbek opposition leaders have not urged their compatriots to fight on the barricades, but have called Islam Karimov, whose presidential term expired in late January, an illegitimate figure. The Birdamlik (Solidarity) movement has urged residents of major cities to stage a national march of protest on March 8 (International Women's Day). Turkmen dissidents have called the February presidential elections a farce that has "launched a second dictatorship."

The emergence of radical slogans is a direct consequence of the opposition's removal from political processes in Central Asian republics. Do they have a chance to bring about regime change? The radicals are hoping for massive public protests. There are precedents to follow - under public pressure, former Tajik President Rakhmon Nabiyev had to leave his post in the summer of 1992, and Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev had to follow suit in the spring of 2005. In both cases the opposition generated a huge wave of protests against the demoralized elite.

But today the roles have changed - the governments have become stronger, while the oppositions in exile do not enjoy broad support. The Tajik government is much more confident than it was seven years ago when it controlled only part of the republic. Rakhomov is not likely to be tempted by Vatandor's promise of a guaranteed life-long pension. Despite the discontent of part of the elite with the limitless appetites of his entourage, the ruling clique has not only economic and administrative levers, but also a police force.

"Nobody will be able to urge Tajiks to take part in anti-government rallies after the civil war," said Mukhiddin Kabiri, the leader of Islamic Revival, an opposition party. He believes that even the legal parties find it hard to influence political processes in Tajikistan, and that a new movement set up abroad is not likely to enjoy much support.

One of the leaders of Uzbekistan's opposition Birlik (Unity) party, Pulat Akhunov, who lives in Sweden, does not see any prospects of a "color revolution" in his country. His article "Let's Beat our Swords into Ploughshares" has angered Karimov's opponents. They have accused the author of betrayal and accommodation of "the bloody dictator's" regime. But his arguments are well-grounded. Akhunov writes that the party leaders "hate each other more than they do President Karimov" and will be unable to coordinate massive protests. He notes that hopes that the regime would mellow under the pressure of the democratic West have gone up in smoke. Akhunov concludes that it is essential to cooperate with the authorities in order to develop a civil society and overcome massive poverty.

The Turkmen opposition is not averse to the idea of beating swords into ploughshares, either. One of the co-chairmen of the Turkmen Republican Party (in exile), Bairam Shikhmuradov, has emphasized the need to "get ready to participate in the political process." In an interview with Russian journalists he said "Being outside the country, the opposition can do nothing for it - all it could do would be against it. We were destroying the dictatorship, getting and spreading information about the illegal actions of the authorities, and trying to persuade outside forces to intervene directly in the Turkmen crisis. This was a tough struggle, and many lost their lives. Now the situation has changed, and we should change, too."

Are those on the other side of the barricades ready for change?

The political systems adapted to a particular leader are not ready to incorporate the ideologically alien opposition. At one time, under heavy pressure, the Tajik rulers had to agree to the return of the opposition that fought against them, and give it a 30% quota in government bodies. But opposition leaders were ousted from political life as Rakhmonov consolidated his power.

 There is no indication that the Uzbek or Turkmen authorities will agree to accept a moderate opposition. Why would they want to do so? It appears that the projects suggested by the radicals (liberalization after a revolutionary change of government) and the moderates (cooperation with the government for the sake of reforms) are unrealistic.

Only Kyrgyzstan may take a special road. It differs from neighboring republics in some major aspects - its relatively free press and influential civil sector prevent the formation of a personal dictatorship. The Kyrgyz character is based on anarchy, and was tempered in the traditions of military democracy. The elite, which is very different from the Uzbek, Tajik, or Turkmen powers that be, is not an integral whole. The struggle over the constitution will intensify with the emergence of the United Front - its leader, Felix Kulov, wants to consolidate the opposition. To weaken President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, his opponents will try to revive a version of the Fundamental Law that limits presidential powers. Probably, in the course of this process the elite and society will elaborate their basic values, without which the construction of a modern political system is unthinkable. But this will happen only if the struggle between the elites does not bury the weak government structure.

Incidentally, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan are not guaranteed against crises, either. But the risks stem from the problem of transferring power rather than from the opposition, which has been withdrawn from the system.

To sum up, the courses that the nations of Central Asia will take have been determined. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan will develop in line with the preset parameters of authoritarian rule. Kyrgyzstan has prerequisites for the formation of a political system with parties and an independent parliament. It may follow a different road.

The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily represent those of RIA Novosti.
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