MOSCOW. (Tatyana Stanovaya for RIA Novosti) - January 1, 2007, will be one year after the gas war between Russia and Ukraine broke out: the review of energy policies toward post-Soviet republics has allowed Russia to put its relations with almost all of them on a market-oriented basis.
Paradoxically, this to a large extent helped to overcome the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, as foreign political failures of the Orange government drastically weakened its position inside the country.
Gas supply was turned off on January 1, 2006, which came as a blow for Ukraine, European consumers and the multimillion audience witnessing the shock therapy Moscow was conducting in post-Soviet states. Russia came under a wave of criticisms and was accused of using gas as a political weapon. The crisis in Russian-Ukrainian political relations peaked. Ukraine was on the brink of parliamentary elections, in the run-up to which the U.S. had abolished the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and signed the WTO accession protocol, although Kiev had not yet adopted the necessary laws. The country became a battlefield in the geopolitical struggle between the East and the West. Moscow's stand was straightforward: why should it subsidize an economy whose geopolitical priority is NATO membership?
At that time it seemed that the crisis would last for several years, just as is the case with Georgia, whose relations with Russia have not seen a glimpse of light for a long time. However, summing up the year's results, we can already say that the West has lost another round in the geopolitical struggle for Ukraine, opening for Russia the door toward improving its relations with its neighbor.
The Orange kept losing their positions throughout the year. First the pro-presidential bloc Our Ukraine and the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc lost the parliamentary election to Viktor Yanukovich's Party of Regions. This was followed by many months of talks on a parliamentary coalition after the constitutional reform had come into force and weakened President Viktor Yushchenko's power.
Fighting to keep control over the executive body, Yushchenko did not allow uncontrolled populist Tymoshenko to become prime minister and so missed the moment for setting up a coalition with the Regions on favorable terms. As a result, he lost everything: the Regions created a coalition with Socialists and Communists, imposing itself on the president and starting a quick expansion inside the power structures and on such presidential prerogatives as the foreign policy.
The foreign policy is becoming increasingly evasive for the president. The prime minister is taking the initiative at talks with the West and Russia. Yanukovich is not trying to accelerate developments in the Euro-Atlantic direction, preserving the balance of interests between the Ukrainian Orange and proponents of Russia. Even the West, after handing out advanced votes of confidence, soon made it clear that Ukraine would not join the EU in the foreseeable future. As a result, pro-Western policies ceased to be the government's ideology, alleviating Moscow's irritation. Kiev's policies have become more pragmatic; it no longer rules out involvement in pro-Russian projects, such as the Common Economic Space.
Competition between the rapidly weakening Yushchenko and strengthening Yanukovich is beneficial for Russia, making its dialogue with Kiev as efficient as it can be. Yanukovich, who is in fact not a pro-Russian politician, has to get closer to Russia and look for compromises, fearing that his mistakes can be used by his political opponents. During his premiership, Russia has scored several victories, such as lifting the Transdnestr blockade and extending gas contracts on acceptable terms. Under the agreements signed after the gas war, Russia had gas transit prices fixed for the next five years, separating them from gas prices for Ukraine. This is the main outcome of that conflict. The Kremlin's strategic line now is towards decreasing its dependence on transit countries. This goal lies at the foundation of the current crisis in relations with Belarus, which has long been refusing to establish a joint venture between Gazprom and Beltransgaz.
Yanukovich made sure that his country would be buying gas at $135 per 1,000 cu m, which is one of the lowest prices in the former Soviet Union. He received "assistance" in this issue from Turkmenistan's late president Saparmurat Niyazov, who had raised gas prices for Russia to $100 per 1,000 cu m. Fearing to lose monopoly on gas exports to Ukraine, Russia had to agree to sell gas almost at cost price.
Russia and Ukraine are entering the New Year with their relations stabilized, as testified by Russian President Vladimir Putin's recent visit. The drastic weakening of the Orange inside the country allowed Putin to redirect his diplomatic efforts from Yushchenko to Yanukovich, simultaneously supporting the diarchy.
Yet there has been no breakthrough in Russian-Ukrainian relations and it is unlikely: patchwork peace is now beneficial for both countries, which are not interesting in escalating their differences. Stability will prevail for some time, but as soon as the conflict inside the Ukrainian government fades and one of the parties (either the Orange or the Regions) restores its domination, relations may sour once again.
Tatyana Stanovaya is an expert at the Center for Political Technologies
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
