MOSCOW, (RIA Novosti political commentator Dmitry Kosyrev) - This week a report that merits careful attention will be presented at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.
I am referring to the report of the Trilateral Commission, "Engaging with Russia: The Next Phase," presented at the commission's annual meeting in Tokyo in April 2006.
It has been placed on the commission's web site and widely read all over the world, but not in Russia.
The Trilateral Commission was formed in 1973 by private individuals from Japan, Europe (European Union countries), and North America (United States and Canada) to foster closer cooperation among these core democratic industrialized parts of the world with shared leadership responsibilities in the wider international system.
It has been alleged that all global events, as well as governments, are controlled by powerful "global puppet masters" through their "agents of influence," and that the Trilateral Commission, reportedly created by Zbigniew Brzezinski, U.S. National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981, is the visible top of the system.
This year's report has three authors: Roderic Lyne, Strobe Talbott, and Koji Watanabe. Lyne was Britain's ambassador to Russia from 2000 to 2004, and Watanabe represented Japan in 1993-1996, while Talbott had been Special Adviser to the U.S. Secretary of State on the New Independent States (1993-1994).
These are formidable men. The importance of their 200-page report is not in the recommendation to the West to revise its Russian policy, since the need to do so had become clear several years ago. It was in the 1990s that the Western leaders thought of turning Russia into an applicant for EU and NATO membership, or returning this "prodigal daughter" into the lap of the Western civilization.
The current critical publications about Russia in the American and European press are proof of their embarrassment. The old policy did not succeed, and there is no new policy on Russia. However, those who mold new policies have not expressed their attitude to the problem so far.
The importance of the above report is that it reflects the opinions of policy-makers, who have suggested a policy that could be willingly accepted, fully or partially, in the Kremlin and Russian society.
The three authors recommend the West to admit that it cannot influence events in Russia and should stop engaging in "megaphone diplomacy" and lurching "from euphoria to despair." Instead, it should facilitate changes in Russia that suit the West wherever possible. The authors also recommend the Western leaders to admit that they want "Russia to be strong, prosperous and successful, not weak, divided, unstable and poor."
They write that it will not benefit the West or "Russia to have weak and unstable countries on its borders," but creating stable countries there would take long. The report does not advocate assistance to political opportunists in Georgia or Ukraine, but it says, "the West should defend the right of the Ukrainians to make a free decision" with regard to integration into the EU and NATO. "Opinion surveys in Ukraine suggest that there is no clear majority yet for EU membership, and a clear majority against NATO accession."
The authors of the report censure Georgia, writing, "The administration of President Saakashvili (...) has disappointed the hopes vested in it." The illusion that its accession to NATO or the EU would solve the country's problems should not be encouraged. Belarus should be left alone to decide what it wants, Russia or the West. As for Uzbekistan, "it is unrealistic to envisage a flowering Western-style democracy in any measurable timescale." Instead, the West should promote business relations with it.
The formula suggested for Russia is the same: to involve Russian business in the global economy and encourage tourism (which calls for resolving visa problems), and ties in education. Another suggestion is to promote the dialogue of experts, because their "expertise" on Russia "has become surprisingly weak in much of Europe."
The authors suggest, with some reservations, cooperating with Russia in the North Caucasus (Chechnya), recognizing its interests in the Middle East that do not always coincide with the interests of the U.S. or Europe, and accepting Russia's energy concept because it is built on mutual dependence of supplier and consumer.
An interesting idea about the G8 is expressed in the report. The authors write that Russia's admission to the Group should be regarded as the first step towards broadening its membership, with China and India as "obvious candidates" that might restore the global influence of the G8 in new conditions.
The report is a private initiative, although advanced by an arguably influential group. We can scrutinize it for compatibility between words and deeds, but the authors' logic is clear. They write that relations with Russia could be modeled on the principles of US-China relations, which is not bad at all.
One of the secondary elements of the report concerns pure philology. The authors write that the West should stop describing relations with Russia as a "strategic partnership," because "the idea of partnership implies levels of trust and congruence of values that do not yet exist."
However, "strategic partnership" is the phrase used in the West to denote its illusions about quickly making Russia part of the Western political structure. It has turned out, however, that the Russian voters, as well as the Russian political class, accept only equitable partnership, with respectful dialogue on values and interests. Russia is a horse that refuses to be harnessed. In addition, Russia's standing in the world has changed since the 1990s, and it no longer accepts the role of a "junior partner."
The authors of the reports did not find any new words to describe relations with Russia. I would suggest adjectives "respectful" and "understanding" with regard to both parties. As for the noun, we can find it later, and it may well be the good old "partnership."
