MOSCOW, (Boris Makarenko, deputy head of the Center of Political technologies, for RIA Novosti) - The aggravation of the Iranian nuclear problem alongside the active preparations for the G8 summit makes one think about the long road covered by Russia-U.S. relations since their antiterrorism honeymoon in 2001. Do the two countries have a future together?
Political statements and expert commentaries made on both sides of the ocean are not optimistic and filled with mutual suspicions and accusations. Worse still, the complicated reality of bilateral relations is compounded by persisting myths.
The first level of myths concerns the "doves" and "hawks" in the United States. Washington and Moscow like to scrutinize differences in the views on Russia of "Old Dick" Cheney and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, of the aggressively anti-Russian Senate lobby led by John McCain and the balanced position of the White House. There are differences, of course, but this does not change the essence of the problem: Russia is just small change when it comes to the internal political struggle in the United States.
America has never had a vice president as active in foreign and domestic policy as Cheyney. An important member of the Bush Sr. team, Cheney has also become a close ally of Bush Jr. Bureaucratic logic forces the State Secretary to protect her field (foreign policy) from the vice president, who, according to the logic of political life in America, should be nothing more than a figurehead. And the Russian issue is only one of many fields of inside struggle in the administration.
McCain's team started accumulating sleaze about Russia in 2000, hoping to use it in the struggle not against Russia, but against Democratic candidate Albert Gore, the partner of Viktor Chernomyrdin in the Russo-American commission on economic and technological cooperation. However, Republican candidate George Bush snatched the Russian card from McCain. Refusing to stop fighting for the White House office, the Senator is now applying it against the outgoing president, even though both are Republicans.
The second group of myths concerns "bad America and good Europe." This is not as simple as it may seem at first glance. Contradictions between the Old and New Worlds became a reality after the demise of the Soviet Union, as proved by the French-German opposition to the U.S. operation in Iraq. Moreover, Europe is much more interested in constructive relations with Russia than with its overseas partner, the United States.
There is also a difference between Old Europe and some new members of the European Union (Poland and the Baltic countries), which want to accumulate political capital by playing the pro-American tune (which irritates Paris and Berlin).
Playing on these contradictions is a logical occupation for Russian diplomacy, but it should see their true scale. There is a long list of issues on which Europe and America differ as much the "good cop" differs from the "bad cop". This includes the issue of energy security. Europe did not cry out about the gas crisis in Ukraine, though it was more worried over Russia's stance than the U.S. Another issue concerns the critical view of Russia's internal problems, in particular the law on non-governmental organizations. Importantly, Europe is acting like a police officer and not as Russia's defense attorney.
What will we have if the multitude of these myths is laid to rest? Paradoxically, the answer is provided in the report, "Russia's Wrong Direction: What the United States Can and Should Do?", recently published by the Council on Foreign Relations, a nonpartisan resource for information and analysis. According to the authors of the report, the West, and in particular the U.S., should diversify their attitude to relations with Russia, opting for a method described as "selective cooperation".
The report goes too far in some ways and offers quite a few biased opinions, not to mention recommendations, but the general trend of future West-Russia relations is clear.
The West will maintain a high level of mutual understanding in the field of international security, including nuclear weapons and the nonproliferation regime (and such a hot subject as Iran's nuclear program, on which Russia and the U.S. have a strategic agreement despite tactical differences), as well as global security and approaches to many regional conflicts.
But the U.S. will try to mount pressure on Russia by minimizing its differences with Europe. For example, it may try to preserve the G7 within the G8, meaning that even though Russia remains a member of the club of industrialized nations, the U.S. will first come to terms with the G7 on ways to develop relations with Russia. Or it may call on Europe to coordinate a common stand on energy security and attitude to Russia's internal political development.
This stand, which is presented as pragmatic, is actually fraught with problems for the West.
First, the goal of attaining "the complete unity" of Europe and America for pressurizing Russia is hardly attainable, because the Old World has taken a widely different stand on this issue.
Second, The Bush administration could go too far in spreading democracy. This issue in the rhetoric of the U.S. administration is not limited to Russia, but is used as the ideological substantiation for America's policy regarding Iraq and Iran. Since the U.S. is fighting a losing battle there and the election campaign is drawing closer, the Bush team may be tempted to lean more heavily in this area.
In this situation, it may play the democracy card against Russia with excessive zeal, which may increase tensions.
Fortunately, there are signals of a different order, such as the pledge of the U.S. president to personally control Russia's WTO accession talks (contrary to the recommendations of the Defense Policy Board), which promises a positive solution to the problem. Preparations for the G8 summit are proceeding constructively, which offers the hope of mutual understanding at the summit.
Though chances for improvement in mutual relations are slim, the limits of deterioration have been clearly outlined. Russian and American diplomacy can act within the "corridor of possibilities", trying to extend it and build up trust and mutual understanding where possible.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
