ESTONIA
One of the main events of the week is the cancelled visit to Estonia of Modest Kolerov, head of the Russian President's department for inter-regional and cultural relations with other countries, who had failed to obtain a visa in time. The press sees political motives behind the Foreign Ministry's bureaucratic delays and suggests that the visit was planned to coincide with the congress of the country's largest Russian-speaking party to encourage the integration of pro-Russian forces for the next parliamentary election. "One party in the rear is worth five armor columns... By an odd coincidence, a Kremlin spin doctor wanted to arrive in Estonia at the precise point when the local political arena started preparations for the next year's election. There will be no surprise if the strange underground congress of the United People's Party creates a new movement or party that will claim votes of all Russian speakers at the next parliamentary election." (Eesti Paevaleht, February 9.) "Opportunities of Russian politics in Estonia have never been more limited than today... It is completely obvious that Estonia no longer has a reason to be afraid of strong-voiced Kremlin nightingales and can grant them entry visas. Our experts would be curious to see which local politicians would try to win the guest's favor and thus to find out who is who." (Eesti Paevaleht, February 10.)
LATVIA
The press interprets the statement of Russia's permanent representative to the UN, who said that Moscow preferred the traditional way of electing the UN Secretary General, i.e. by rotation, as Russia's refusal to support the Latvian president's nomination. "This can be understood as follows: Russia has indirectly rejected the two most often mentioned candidates for the world's highest diplomatic post, Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga and former Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski." (Neatkariga Rita Avize, February 11.)
LITHUANIA
The most popular topic discussed in the mass media is the suggestion that the "cartoon scandal" was initiated by Russian special services as Moscow's revenge for Denmark's refusal to extradite Chechen separatist Akhmed Zakayev in 2002. "When commenting on the developments, political expert Raimundas Lopata said he felt Moscow's involvement. The professor says it is revenge of one state against another, small state." (Lietuvos Zines, February 9.) "The version correlates with the words of former KGB high-ranking officer Alexander Litvinenko, who had fled Russia and obtained asylum in London. He claimed that the cartoon scandal had been arranged by the KGB. Litvinenko's version was circulated in the parliament the day before yesterday." (Respublika, February 10.)
UKRAINE
There are positive remarks about Russian-Ukrainian gas agreements. "The outcome of the gas crisis has unexpectedly turned out beneficial for Ukraine: the signed agreements have given it the opportunity to buy gas at the best possible price, preserving its ownership over the gas transportation system. Despite the gloomy forecasts, Ukraine has managed to build profitable relations with Russia." (ForUm, February 9.)
The decision of Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov to raise prices on Turkmen gas from autumn 2006 may affect the profits of RosUkrEnergo joint venture (which sells Ukraine gas from Russia and Central Asia), which will force the Kremlin to either give up the agreements or change the price of mixed gas proportionately. "Turkmenbashi's decision is profitable for Russia, because it gives Moscow an additional tool of putting pressure on Ukraine, while allowing it to stay out of the conflict. It will be hard for the Ukrainian leadership to explain another rise of prices on all goods and services by the Kremlin's imperial ambitions." (Oligarkh.net, February 14.)
MOLDOVA
The official press is sarcastic about the study trip of the Russian and Ukrainian Security Councils to Transdnestr enterprises. Russia is accused of double standards, and the situation is compared to the Middle East. "If deputy secretaries of the Russian and Ukrainian Security Councils visit Transdnestr enterprises 500 more times, they will still not find any weapons, and even if they do, they will pass it off as vacuum cleaners, fishing rods and brooms... If Hamas is not recognized and loses international financial aid, will Russia be able to support the Palestinian authorities with a couple of billion dollars annually? The question is not rhetorical, because in the last 15 years we have seen Moscow financing the Tiraspol regime, indirectly but very efficiently." (Moldova Suverane, February 14.)
The hike in gas prices initiated by Gazprom will eventually affect the Moldovan population, journalists believe. "The population will suffer. There will be long-term consequences, the poverty of the population will affect the politics and the government will lose its pre-election capital." (Timpul, February 9.)
ARMENIA
Mass media partially agree with the opposition, which sees the kindling of anti-Russian hysteria as the authorities' attempt to disguise their own political failures and inability to establish adequate relations with Russia. "The recent anti-Russian hysteria in Armenia has been provoked by the authorities... Armenia is unable to settle the existing problems with its strategic ally and puts the blame on the stubborn Russian bear." (Aikaka Zhamanak, February 8.)
Some analysts see new opportunities for Armenia in the situation with energy supplies. Refusing to accept Moscow's aid and paying for gas at international prices, Armenia may become independent, they say. "We should remember that possession of hydrocarbons does not guarantee political dominance or even sovereignty... If we hold out and adjust to new conditions, as the Baltic states did in the early 1990s, we will truly break away from Moscow. This means that fighting for total control, Moscow may lose whatever control it has." (Yeter, February 9.)
GEORGIA
Experts question the Kremlin's statement that the problem of Kosovo's sovereignty should have a universal solution. Moscow will not demand sovereignty for the problem republics of Georgia - Abkhazia and South Ossetia - because this would seriously damage its geopolitical interests. "Russia's deliberations on the issue are nothing more than its blackmail of the West. Even the recognition of Kosovo's sovereignty will not change anything for the self-proclaimed republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia does not want them to be internationally recognized. It will not risk damaging its position in the UN Security Council and the G8 over the two republics. It needs to fix its stand only to blackmail Georgia." (24 Saati, February 13.)
The republican media comment on the Georgian parliament's decision to demand the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers from the zone of the Georgia-Ossetia conflict, and try to predict the consequences of Tbilisi's new ultimatum to Russia. "The opposition fears that the parliamentary decision to initiate the withdrawal of the Russian peacekeepers will remain on paper. But experts think there may be a real threat of war." (Rezonansi, February 8.)
Analysts say the parliament's decision is unsubstantiated and populist. It "is not enough to ensure the pullout of the Russian peacekeepers. The parliament's resolution is sufficient for Georgia, as only the president can demand withdrawal on the international level. Raising the issue on president's demand would place Georgia in a very difficult situation. There are signs that this is happening, which is why the president will not approve the decision. The parliamentary majority is making populist statements." (Akhali taoba, February 10.)
AZERBAIJAN
The opposition media present the Georgian experience as an example of policy that can ensure real independence from Moscow. "Georgia is moving away from Russia, gradually limiting its military and political presence. The withdrawal of the Russian military bases and the replacement of the pro-Kremlin regime in Adzharia are practical examples of this policy. It is yielding results although Russia is directly involved in the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts. Despite the Russian military presence, Georgia prefers to use Western, primarily American, pressure on Russia in order to settle these conflicts in its interests. The Kremlin is backing down under this pressure, and will continue to back down for at least the next 10-15 years. Therefore, it is vitally important for us to take a stand as soon as possible and move toward membership in a stable system of collective security, which the military structures of the Commonwealth of Independent States cannot ensure." (Zerkalo, February 8.)
The republican media are watching the international gas market for signs of Russo-American confrontation. "Russia, seeing that Georgia and Ukraine have turned away from it, has decided to stop using the incentive of the cheap energy resources. The United States, which is the main donor of the newly free countries on the post-Soviet space, was not happy that Georgia bought gas in Iran using American money. The U.S. sees positive aspects in the idea of the trans-Caspian pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan for strengthening its positions in Central Asia (in view of its recent crushing defeat in Uzbekistan) and for solving the energy security problems of its energy-dependent allies. In other words, the U.S. can play on the nerves of its main rivals in the region - Russia and Iran - by stepping up its actions in the region." (Ekho, February 14.)
KAZAKHSTAN
The official media give negative comments on the statements of the run-away oligarch and former Yukos co-owner Leonid Nevzlin, who condemned the invitation of the Palestinian Hamas leaders to Moscow. "Positioning himself as the defender of Israeli interests, and rejecting reconciliation with Hamas out of hand, he (Nevzlin) may reduce to naught all Israeli diplomatic efforts to develop relations with closest neighbors. For Nevzlin Hamas and the problems of Jews are merely an excuse for attacking the Kremlin. For Israel this is an issue of life and death, and any political gambling is impermissible. (Nomad, February 13).
The press is writing about a reduction in the number of Russians, leaving Kazakhstan for Russia. This budding trend is primarily generated by improving economic conditions in Kazakhstan, and its leaders' balanced nationalities policy. "Those who wanted to leave, have already left, but many would like to come back. Besides, Russian legislation has a tendency towards discrimination. The repatriates have to take an exam in Russian... During the years of independence the population of Russia has gone down by 12 million people...the process of depopulation is going on there." (Liter.kz, February 8)
KYRGYZSTAN
Some sources, worried by the periodical splashes of migration of Kyrgyz citizens, attribute it primarily to Moscow's insufficient attention to the problems of Russian-speaking people in this post-Soviet republic. "Having levers of real influence on the domestic policies of Central Asian nations, Russia succeeds in getting economic preferences, but keeps 'forgetting' about the status of its compatriots. Only recently Russian President Putin signed a document on setting up an interdepartmental group to develop a government program, which would encourage compatriots to move back to Russia at their own free will." (Gazeta KG, February 13)
UZBEKISTAN
Opposition publications emphasize that support of Uzbekistan by Russia, which has replaced NATO forces in the region, is not enough. "Today, Russia remains the main donor for Uzbekistan, and has recently signed an allied agreement with the latter... Establishment of a Russian military base on Uzbek territory could further promote stability in the republic, and reduce Tashkent's military expenses on the maintenance of its military infrastructure. However, for the time being Russia refrains from deploying troops or installations on Uzbek territory. Thus, the U.S. withdrawal from Khanabad has placed an extra burden on the Uzbek defense budget. (Fergana.Ru, February 9).
A series of publications in the official press is devoted to the Russian-Uzbek gas agreement, which is described as a highly beneficial move in the economic interests of both countries. The press denies the link of the agreement with the domestic political events in the republic. "If it were not for the gas deal, there would be no serious investment, the influence of 'remote' multinationals would increase, and illusive gains from illusive promises would be discussed. Meanwhile, on the other side of the scales is an increase in the revenues of Uzbekistan..., a possibility of creating new businesses and jobs, and competitive companies with a prospect of gaining access to the world market... Official Moscow was one of the few countries to morally support our country after the May events. It seems that it is happy to be a loyal Uzbek ally without asking for reward for its loyalty." (Delovoy partner, February 9).
TAJIKISTAN
The press discusses a clash of interests in Central Asia of three world leaders - Russia, China, and the U.S. Commentators write that Tajikistan has chosen the right political vector, having opted for independence. Stating that at present Russia is a strategic partner of the region's countries, journalists do not rule out a change in the alignment of forces in the future. "Russia has signed an agreement with Tajikistan on the construction of the Rogun hydropower station and the aluminum plant to the tune of over $2 billion, and signed a contract with Uzbekistan to develop oil and gas deposits worth $1.5 billion. Only time will show which of these agreements may be won by the main players". (Millat, February 9).
More publications are covering the hard situation and tragic destiny of Tajik migrants in Russia, and stressing that Russia is using them for political ends. "The migrants are helping save the weak and almost insolvent Tajik government, and are Moscow's trump card in the game with Dushanbe." (Varorud, February 13)
