MOSCOW, July 28 (RIA Novosti political commentator Peter Lavelle). In an article adapted from the book Kremlin Rising: Vladimir Putin's Russia and the End of Revolution and published by The Washington Post, authors Peter Baker and Susan B. Glasser present a skewed interpretation of Vladimir Putin’s presidency and how Russia has changed over the past five years.
The primary thesis Baker and Glasser promote is as follows: “The government had taken over national television, emasculated the power of the country's governors, converted parliament into a rubber stamp, jailed the main financier of the political opposition and intimidated the most potent would-be challengers from entering [politics].” Baker and Glasser are not original with this thesis; it is part and parcel of how Western media report on Russia.
The following casts doubt on the Baker-Glasser thesis and, in the process, on much of what has been written in the West about Russia since Vladimir Putin became president.
“Government control of national television”
When Putin assumed the presidency, most of Russian television was in private hands. Promoting the material and political interests of a small group known as the oligarchs, Russian television was not a haven of free speech as many claim today. What is closer to the truth is that free speech was allowed to those who could afford to pay to have their opinion aired. One has to wonder if Baker and Glasser covered the 1999 parliamentary elections. It is hard to imagine a more media controlled event – oligarch fought oligarch in the most scandalous fashion. This no longer happens. Russian television is clearly not as “colorful” as it once was. However, journalists such as Baker and Glasser fail to ask a fundamental question about the content of state-controlled television today: Are citizens provided with enough information to make decisions about their lives? The answer is yes.
Has the Kremlin shut down political debate on television? This simply is not true. What is true is that there are fewer political talk shows that focus on media specific personalities. Political figures continue to appear on political talk shows and continue to criticize Putin and his government. The Kremlin is also implementing some very controversial social reforms; television programs that used to pump their ratings through crude political debate only increased social tensions. The fact the Kremlin is mindful of uncontrolled, and at times grossly irresponsible, political debate on television certainly does not make it libertarian, but it does not mean opposing views cannot be viewed on the nation’s airwaves.
“Emasculated the power of the country's governors”
There has never been much interest in Russia’s governors on the part of Western journalists– but that has changed. Putin’s decision to appoint governors – instead of through direct election – is an issue often used as proof of Putin’s democratic backsliding. Reigning in regional governors does have a reasonable logic – whether it will actually strengthen Russia’s sovereignty, as the Kremlin claims, is another issue. Appointing governors is not really about fighting terrorism (which is a real threat in Russia), but rather a continuation of Putin’s drive to deny the oligarchs meaningful political power in the regions, an offensive against corruption, and demand that governors be responsible to their constituents.
The real issue that should be addressed is not how this decision to appoint governors is inherently undemocratic, but rather whether this decision will improve the overall administrative governance of Russia. Putin’s aim is to punish governors who serve oligarch interests ahead of the interests of local populations and the state. Putin is also interested in reversing the independence that Yeltsin allowed governors and the ability to accumulate enormous fortunes, while at the same time pocketing state revenues destined to cover social benefits. The recent protests against the monetization of social benefits have been portrayed as protests against Putin, but in fact the protests have demonstrated that many governors aren’t up to the task of dispensing cost benefits effectively (or honestly).
“Converted parliament into a rubber stamp”
Doubtless the Kremlin is pleased to have a legislature to enact its liberal policy initiatives. Few Western journalists ever point out that Putin’s Kremlin is far more liberal in outlook than the majority of the electorate.
However, the Kremlin’s control of the Duma is not as undemocratic or anti-democratic as it would first appear and as it is reported by Western media to be. Putin knows that his reform policies - pension, housing, electoral, educational, and energy - are socially explosive. The street protests against the monetization of Soviet-era social benefits earlier this year stand as an important example of how important reforms can be very unpopular.
Putin, placid on the surface, is in fact a very impatient man. He desires a democratic legitimization of his reform goals but has no intention of being held hostage to the niceties (or vulgarities) of legislative norms that resulted in gridlock during the 1990s.
Additionally, Kremlin majority control of the Duma strikes at the very heart of what has badly damaged parliamentary politics in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union - gross corruption. The Duma will do what the Kremlin wants: Paying, selling, and trading parliamentary deputies is not as easy as it was before.
“Jailed the main financier of the political opposition”
The saga surrounding Mikhail Khodorkovsky and what was once the oil giant Yukos has been probably the most misunderstood and poorly reported story by Western media, with Baker and Glasser no exception.
Much has been written about the "Yukos affair," Khodorkovsky's "rags-to-riches-to-prison" life, and the Kremlin's unrelenting assault on both. Most have centered on the settling of a political vendetta; Khodorkovsky's political ambitions and his funding of the opposition; the Kremlin's greed and envy of the super-wealthy "oligarchs;" and a cynical ploy by Russian President Vladimir Putin to win favor with the electorate by getting tough with the hated oligarchs.
None of these themes is particularly wrong, but none explains the almost tragic inevitability of the Yukos affair and Khodorkovsky's fate.
For Putin the dual assaults have been a "total political solution" covering a wide range of policy problems he inherited when he assumed the presidency in 2000. There can be no doubt Yukos and Khodorkovsky were in Putin's sights long before they started to feel the Kremlin's powerful reach. Once the operation began against both, all Putin had to worry about was the level of collateral damage and the law of unintended consequences.
The Yukos-Khodorkovsky coupling has served the following purposes: a means to legitimize state control over Russia's energy sectors in line with international norms; to ensure political decision-making belongs in the hands of the Kremlin and not oligarchs; to make the state the ultimate arbiter of economic policy; and, most importantly, an effort to legitimize property rights, oddly enough, and the development of Russia's market economy.
“Intimidated the most potent would-be challengers from entering [politics]”
Russia’s political opposition is in disarray, but this is not the Kremlin’s fault. Western journalists can’t bring themselves to admit that most Russian voters have little interest in the policy platforms of liberal-conservative Yabloko or the Union of Right Forces (SPS). This applies to the Communists as well.
The woes of Russia’s opposition are completely self-inflicted. The fact that the Kremlin has taken advantage of this should not be surprising. Politics is about attaining and using power – this game is played out in every Western democracy. Why the Kremlin is not allowed to play the same game is truly mystifying. The Kremlin presented a platform to Russian voters through its vehicles, United Russia, Rodina, and the Liberal Democrat Party. Platforms supporting economic growth, “down with the oligarchy,” and an independent Russian foreign policy have a strong appeal among voters.
The opposition, on the other hand, offers little to the average Russian. In fact, the opposition simply represents failure. Yabloko and SPS continue to be perceived as representations of the failures of Russia’s economic and political transformation since 1991. Their performance during the 2003 parliamentary elections was an embarrassment – de facto support of oligarchic capitalism that destroyed any sense of normality for the average Russian was political suicide. If the platform of the opposition is simply “anti-Putin,” then an independent liberal agenda in Russia is doomed for another generation. However, such a prognosis could quite possibly be too optimistic. Russian liberals have much more in common with Putin and his agenda than with the Communists or Rodina. The continuation of their “anti-Putin” agenda only encourages that Putin’s successor will be far less liberal than Putin.
Journalists like Baker and Glasser often portray Russia under Vladimir Putin as some kind of sinister plot. Such an approach is like observing Russia with “eyes wide shut.” Russia continues to face daunting problems. Reforming the economy is far from finished and the development of a stronger democratic foundation is also needed. However, once Western journalists finally accept that Russia still is a work in progress, the accomplishments of the past five years will be obvious.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.-0-
