Moscow. (Yevgeny Suchkov, for RIA Novosti.) -- The presidential election is still three years ahead, but headlines in many Russian and foreign publications are already screaming: "Who will succeed Putin?" and "How Smoothly Will the Kremlin Run 'Operation Successor'?"
Two basic scenarios are usually considered. The first is momentum based: Power is transferred (i.e., a president is elected) in a relatively stable political situation. Scenario two supposes that stability is out of the question, for one reason or another. Accordingly, the chances of the assumed presidential candidates - former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, Rodina leader Dmitry Rogozin, new Railways Minister Vladimir Yakunin, and various others - and the interests of the political and financial forces supposedly backing them are viewed exclusively through the prism of these two scenarios.
However, this approach omits many factors that could impact Russia's political future and the careers of its leading politicians and that should therefore not be forgotten. The first main character to consider is the Russian voter. Votes have sprung many surprises on the ruling elite at election time. In addition, virtually no parallels are usually drawn between a presidential vote and parliamentary elections, which are slated to precede the former by three months.
It should be remembered that at least the scenario, if not the outcome, of presidential elections since 1996 has been largely determined by the results of State Duma polls. In December 1995, the Communists won, and it was only through incredible efforts that the Kremlin, in league with the "oligarchs," succeeded in getting Boris Yeltsin reelected the following year. At the end of 1999, Yeltsin's dramatic resignation was needed to effect a "soft" transfer of power without a repeat of the upheavals of the summer of 1996.
A successful United Russia campaign preceded the triumphal reelection of Putin for a second term. It is also worth recalling that Yeltsin's and Putin's rivals did not appear out of thin air, but on the back of parliamentary elections. Thus, in order to hand over power smoothly to his successor, Putin needs above all to ensure a sweeping victory for his party at the Duma elections. Given United Russia's slowly but surely declining rating, this is likely to be an uphill task.
And here lies potentially a very serious problem. The elections in Russia in December 2003 and the events in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan demonstrated how clumsy the Kremlin's spin-doctors were. It was interference by these "gurus," with their traditional administrative techniques, that was largely responsible for triggering "revolutionary" situations in former CIS countries. It is not inconceivable that something similar during the December 2007 Duma elections could result in the destabilization of the domestic situation that some politicians so actively seek, and lead to serious problems for the Kremlin in March 2008. Even should a "successor" win, his or her legitimacy - and as a result the stability of the country's entire social and political system - could be very much open to question.
But even if the Kremlin manages to transfer power safely from one figure to another, would this guarantee stability? When the young and energetic Putin succeeded the debilitated Yeltsin, with the last vestiges of his reputation gone, there was general jubilation. If the president retains his current high popularity rating until 2008, his successor could be seen by the majority of the elite and population as just a faded carbon copy, someone led by hand to the top levels. But to reduce the incumbent president's rating artificially to create more comfortable conditions for the successor would be overly risky.
In this light, to speak as some political experts do of the grooming of a successor, and moreover about the chances of some politicians as successors or rivals to the successor, is clearly premature before the December 2007 elections. The only thing that can and should be debated is the chances of Russia's democrats to create by 2007 - at the very latest - something like a systemic opposition able to run for the State Duma under a single ticket. Only a confident showing by a united democratic wing at the parliamentary elections will enable them to field a presidential candidate with a realistic chance of winning.
Today there are, unfortunately, few options for creating an effective association of democrats. This is due both to the profusion and ambitions of their leaders and to the wide array of opposition tools at the disposal of the party of power. "Divide and rule" is the motto under which the current ruling elite will try to carry out a smooth handover of power in 2008. But the consequences of this operation for Russia's future are anybody's guess. Sadly, today this future is as blurred and indistinct as the personalities and chances of the principal players in the March 2008 vote.
Yevgeny Suchkov is director of the Institute of Electoral Technologies.
