A series of color revolutions in the former Soviet states, as well as the fundamental change in the foreign policy of Moldova and the latest events in Uzbekistan, raise the question of the reasons for and, most importantly, the possible consequences of these developments.
The majority of experts who analyze the reasons for these events note general poverty, acute social problems and corrupt regimes in these countries. Indeed, any mass movement or unrest develops against the backdrop of acute discontent of a considerable or larger part of the population with their situation and their belief that there will be no positive changes under the current regime.
However, if these were decisive factors, Ukraine, which has the second or third best living standards in the CIS, would have been one of the last to have its "orange revolution." The revolutionary trailblazers would have been Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
The answer to this seeming discrepancy is simple: the latter countries have harsh, authoritarian regimes, which suppresses public discontent and, above all, the emergence and consolidation of political organizations that could become the driving forces of revolutions.
But what is "authoritarianism"? The answer is also evident: It is a form of government in societies that lag far behind the social and economic standards of Western countries. It may seem strange, but, owing to the logical nature of "traditional" authoritarianism, the attempts to apply democratic Western standards in the most underdeveloped countries (Africa and Afghanistan) resulted in the establishment of authoritarian or totalitarian regimes that only pretend to be Western-type democracies. These regimes are regularly overthrown in coups, which are frequently complemented with public unrest. Hence, the West should not have any illusions about the democratic nature and, most importantly, the stability of such "revolutionary" regimes, especially in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia.
But the development of democracy, which the West understands as the creation and formal operation of Western-type political institutions that introduce market economies open to foreign expansion, is a condition of the Western economic and political expansion.
The CIS countries can be divided into three geographic groups, depending on the people's readiness for Western values and real incorporation into the Western civilization and economic and political structures.
European CIS Countries
From the socio-economic and cultural-historical viewpoint, this region is better prepared for accepting the Western type of democracy. Besides, the crucial assistance to the implementation of US plans in the region will be provided by the European Union, which has adopted a policy of extensive development and eastward enlargement.
The joint operation of these two global players has brought the expected results in Ukraine. It is one of the socially and economically better developed republics of the former Soviet Union; after the "orange revolution," it will quickly reap the economic fruits of the Western expansionist policies.
Re-nationalization in Ukraine will result in the redistribution of property owned by the local oligarchs in favor of not so much the local medium-sized business as the European and American companies, depending on Ukraine's incorporation into Western structures.
In this case, Ukraine will soon see, just as the other East European countries did, a connection between the Western form of democracy, the open market economy, and the advantages of big U.S. and European economic entities over the local operators.
As for Moldova, its incorporation in the West may proceed by way of special relations with Romania, which is a member of Greater Europe. But first the Moldovan leaders will have to settle the problem of Transdnestria.
Belarus, where President Lukashenko uses harshly authoritarian measures and populist policies to control the political situation, presents a serious obstacle to Western expansionism. A chance to overthrow Lukashenko could appear only if problems become markedly worse in relations with Moscow, when Minsk would not be able any longer to use the economic advantages of Russia's special ally.
Transcaucasus
Apart from fulfilling the challenging task of spreading Western standards, this region is of particular interest to the West because of the strategic gas and oil pipelines that run across it from the Caspian shore and Central Asia. Besides, this region is located next to the "soft underbelly" of Russia - the North Caucasus, where instability can be always used as the trump card in the global foreign policy game. But the Caucasus is not Europe. The social, economic, ethnic, religious and political problems of that region are a major hindrance to the development of Western values.
Proof of this is the pro-Western regime in Georgia: Over 90% of votes cast for President Mikhail Saakashvili and the strange death of premier Zurab Zhvania, a politician of the same magnitude, whose seat was quickly filled by a figurehead suggested by the president, show that the region is not ready to accept the pluralist values of the West.
This is also the main reason for the weakness of the Armenian opposition, which is energetically supported by American and European funds. For the second consecutive year, it has been trying to materialize the Tbilisi scenario in Yerevan. Armenia has been retained in the Russian orbit so far thanks to Moscow's military-technical and economic assistance in the confrontation with Azerbaijan over Karabakh.
As for Azerbaijan, though American state and non-governmental structures criticize the Aliyev regime and the West (above all the U.S.) supports the local opposition, the Baku authorities need not fear a color revolution. There is a vast distance between the authoritarian regime of Aliyev and the standards of democracy. But U.S. foreign policy strategists maintain very cautious relations with the country, keeping the democratic opposition on a short leash. The reason is their fear of possible chaos provoked by revolutionary cataclysms in that country, which the U.S. oil companies view as one of the world's most important sources of hydrocarbons and the key area for the potential transit of these reserves from even richer Central Asian fields.
Central Asia
This region is prepared for Western economic and political values even less than the Transcaucasus. The local regimes control the situation in their countries with a different degree of authoritarianism (or totalitarianism, as in Turkmenistan). Despite the temptation to try to bring democracy to these countries, the top leaders of the West seem to be aware of risks entailed in provoking an outbreak of social activity in the underdeveloped Central Asian states.
The example of the "revolutionary-democratic" Kyrgyzstan, where the Akayev regime had tried, without success, to follow the Western rules of democracy and which had the largest number of Western funds and societies in the CIS, shows that the territorial/clan contradictions are decisive for that region.
The recent social explosion in the Ferghana Valley, which was certainly provoked by the "secular" dissatisfaction of the people with their leadership, can, with much greater degree of probability, be led by Islamic fundamentalists and drug barons connected with them, rather than pro-Western democracies.
The totalitarian regime of Saparmurat Niyazov in Turkmenistan can only be overthrown with the country's leader (which is both simple and difficult). But such a coup would push the country into a dark period of conflict in the struggle of the elite groups for raw materials. The disintegration of the country, where clan connections camouflaged as the modern "local" protectionism remain very strong, does not seem probable.
The bloody civil war in Tajikistan in the first half of the 1990s, which began under the banner of democracy, showed what mindless copying of Western political institutions can do to a regional country.
Kazakhstan has a special place in this group of critically explosion-prone countries. Rich in material resources, Kazakhstan could become a strong candidate for integration into the Western economic and military-strategic system. Besides, despite the domination of traditional relations in the masses, the new Kazakh elite is rather well educated and accepts Western values (but not the West), and a part of it would like to take the leading posts of "senior comrades."
But the regime of Nursultan Nazarbayev has vast raw material resources, which allow socio-economic maneuvers, and learned to control the political ambitions of the New Kazakhs by repeatedly reproducing a tame opposition. Besides, revolutionary cataclysms may split the country into "the Russian North" and "the Kazakh South."
Therefore, any implementation of the "color revolutions" scenario in Central Asia could have highly negative consequences.
The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and may not necessarily represent the opinions of the editorial board.
