The Pentagon has over 3,000 mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles in Kuwait for use in the forthcoming liberation of Mosul, according to a report by the US News website. The US will more than likely provide these units to either the Kurdish Peshmerga or the Iraqi Army and will not operate them in battle themselves.
Prior to the counter-offensive, however, a lot of issues had to be worked out in Iraq and across the so-called ‘anti-ISIL coalition’. After everything is in working order, the US is predicted to ‘Lead From Behind’ and indirectly command the entire campaign. When it’s over, however, a new dilemma will present itself, since it must be decided whether to continue the momentum and chase the terrorists into Syria (and formally expand the operation into a regime-change one) or assist Baghdad with piecing the war-torn and domestically divided country together.
Wheeling And Dealing
Prior to the commencement of any counter-offensive, Iraq needed to strike as many strategic deals as possible in order to consolidate its position and enhance its chance of success. Here’s what they did:
The Kurdish Compromise:
Baghdad provided major concessions to the Kurds in mid-December in order to end the nearly year-long crisis between the two. Whether it was in the central government’s best long-term interests or not, it thought it wise to work out the kinks in the Kurdish relationship as soon as possible so that a short-term ‘unified’ military front against ISIL could occur in 2015.
Sunni Support:
Since they’re a demographic minority, the Sunnis wanted to safeguard (and supplement) their power as much as possible in exchange for supporting the counter-offensive, hence their hushed calls for autonomy after the ISIL war is over. Although no public decision has been made in this regard, it is telling that the US and Baghdad are now arming the militias, and that the tentative idea for a ‘National Guard’ essentially institutionalizes them into the national framework, which could easily fracture into a regional one after ISIL is expelled.
Regional Reassurances:
The final piece of the puzzle was for Iraqi PM Abadi to visit the neighboring countries of Jordan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey all throughout December in order to receive reassurances of their support during the counter-offensive. It’s not known what was specifically discussed, but it’s very probable that multilateral coordination against ISIL (overseen by an American aegis) was the primary topic of conversation.
Leading From Behind
As it’s been demonstrating ever since the 2011 War on Libya, the US will in all probability reuse its favorite ‘Lead From Behind’ template in Iraq during the counter-offensive. To clarify, this concept was initially coined to refer to “Discreet U.S. military assistance with France and Britain doing the trumpeting”, as the NYT’s Roger Cohen described it at the time. As part of the patterned approach that has been seen since then, it could more accurately be described as simply being proxy warfare, where the US may provide some heavy and critical strikes (if there’s open warfare involved) in conjunction with its massive behind-the-scenes support while other players do the grunt work. The US role in coordinating the destabilization of Syria is a perfect example of this strategy, and Turkey is the typical grunt.
When it comes to the anti-ISIL counter-offensive, the US has already deployed a few thousand advisors and logistics-support troops to train and support the Peshmerga, Sunni militias, and Iraqi Army. As was mentioned at the beginning of this article, it’s not anticipated that US troops will be behind the wheel of any military vehicles fighting on the front line, since these may instead be leased or sold to the Peshmerga or Iraqi Army, who would be the ones driving them. At the onset of the offensive, the US will lead the way in conducting heavy airstrikes against ISIL positions and will follow these up with surgical strikes as needed to support the various battles underway. By doing this, the US provides a heavy support component to the war, but isn’t the one directly fighting it, as that role goes to the proxy forces more deeply involved on the ground.
Switching Storms
Defeating ISIL in Iraq would only be one ‘victory’ in the anti-ISIL coalition’s larger regional war, as two other major storms would immediately be on the horizon right afterwards. The most pressing topic for the coalition (which could also be termed a ‘regime change coalition’) would be whether they should continue the war into Syria, where predictably most of ISIL will retreat into, likely using Raqqa as their military redoubt. With the troops on the offensive and the terrorists on the run, it may look like an enticing opportunity to carry the conventional war over into Syria. Should this happen, mission creep (or rather, mission ‘leap’ by the speed of it) could quickly turn the anti-terror war into a full-fledged regime change operation, either out of military convenience or because of a purposely provocation against the Syrian Arab Army.
Anyhow, regardless of whether these events takes place, one thing is certain — that Iraq must find a way to rebuild its national unity in order to stay a singular state. This would be extremely difficult to do with three competing armed forces (Pesherma, Sunni militias [by then de-facto legitimized through the ‘National Guard’], and the Iraqi Army), each of which may have competing external backers (perhaps the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, respectively).
Should the anti-ISIL war be expanded to Syria, Baghdad would have to decide whether it is worth overextending itself before it consolidates its authority (if it can) across the rest of the country. This could precede a new crisis which could once more tear Iraq apart, but this time, once and for all.
